


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COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM MASTER PLAN (U)

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PACOM HEADQUARTERS
REVIEW ON 30 JUNE 2000

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C3SRD
Ser S139
25 March 1981

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To: Distribution

Subj: PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan

Encl: (1) PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan

1. Enclosure (1) sets forth the concept, description and general guidance for the development of the command and control system required to effectively execute the command mission. It is viewed by this command as a dynamic plan that will be reviewed quarterly and updated as required to reflect new requirements, missions, and C2 issues.
2. This plan is submitted to the JCS for approval in accordance with Annex G, Volume 1, JCS Pub 19.
3. The PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan, enclosure (1) to CINCPAC Ser S78 of 29 February 1980, is hereby superseded and should be destroyed in accordance with applicable security regulations.

JAMES M. ROCKWELL
Major General, USA
Director for Command, Control,
and Communications Systems

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Security Instructions

1. The long title of this plan is the PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan.
2. This document is classified ~~SECRET NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~ to protect information revealing the overall development and implementation of plans for the command and control system. Information herein will be disseminated only to those agencies and personnel whose official duties specifically require knowledge of the plan, including those required to develop supporting plans.
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Record of Changes

1. Changes to this plan will be issued with identifying sequential numbers. Enter the change and make the appropriate entries below. After changes have been made, file the Change Transmittal Letter in front of the plan.

Change No.	Date Entered	Signature	Rank/Rate

2. For convenient reference, changes will be identified in the outside margin of each page by a vertical bar.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM MASTER PLAN

<u>Title</u>	<u>Page</u>
SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS/RECORD OF CHANGES	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
SECTION 1 - MISSION AND ORGANIZATION	1
Purpose	1
Mission of CINCPAC	2
PACOM Concept of Operations	3
CINCPAC Responsibilities	3
Command Relationships	5
Threat	7
SECTION 2 - PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM	9
Functions	9
Current Composition	9
SECTION 3 - COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM OBJECTIVES	11
Basic Doctrine	11
General System Objectives	11
Required System Capabilities	13
System Goals	14
SECTION 4 - REQUIREMENTS	17
General	17
Communications	17
Facilities	20
Computer Support	21
Executive Aids	21
Subunified Commands	22
SECTION 5 - INTEROPERABILITY	24
General	24
Definition	24
Current Actions	25
Future Actions	25
SECTION 6 - EVALUATION	25

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ENCLOSURE (1) - GLOSSARY OF TERMS	1
ENCLOSURE (2) - CINCPAC REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES	1
APPENDIX A - Communications for RTF/JTF Operations (ROC 4-75) ...	A-1
APPENDIX B - PACOM MEECN Communications Requirements (ROC 5-75)..	B-1
APPENDIX C - CINCPAC ABNCP Operations Ground Facility WWMCCS Interface (ROC 6-75)	C-1
APPENDIX D - CINCPAC ABNCP WWMCCS Interface (ROC 7-75)	D-1
APPENDIX E - Secure Voice/Record Conferencing Network (ROC 9-75).	E-1
APPENDIX F - Automated Message Processing System (ROC 10-76).....	F-1
APPENDIX G - ABNCP Communications Capability Upgrade (ROC 12-76).	G-1
APPENDIX H - Extension of CINCPAC's Crisis Response Communications System (ROC 14-78)	H-1
APPENDIX I - WWMCCS Required Operational Capability for Joint Multichannel Trunking and Switching System (Post 1984) (ROC 15-80)	I-1
APPENDIX J - WWMCCS Required Operational Capability for CINC, Combined Forces Command (ROC 16-80)	J-1
APPENDIX K - Required Operational Capability for CINCPAC Command Support Aircraft Long Haul Secure Voice Communications (ROC 17-80)	K-1
APPENDIX L - ABNCP Long Haul Secure Voice Communications, CINC Joint Operational Requirement (CJOR 1-80)	L-1
APPENDIX M - Improved Trailing Wire Antenna System for WWABNCP EC-135 abd E4A Aircraft, CINC Joint Operational Requirement (CJOR 2-80)	M-1
APPENDIX N - Airborne Automatic Data Processing (ADP), CINC Joint Operational Requirement (CJOR 3-80)	N-1
APPENDIX O - Switchboard for EC-135P ABNCP, CINC Joint Operational Requirement (CJOR 4-80)	O-1
ENCLOSURE (3) - CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS	1
ENCLOSURE (4) - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (TOP SECRET - Published Separately)	1
ENCLOSURE (5) - BASELINE PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES	1
ENCLOSURE (6) - CINCPAC AIRBORNE COMMAND POST	1

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PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM MASTER PLAN (U)

SECTION 1 (U)

Mission and Organization (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE.

a. (U) The PACOM Command and Control System Master Plan (PCCSMP) identifies the goals and requirements of the PACOM Command and Control System (PCCS). It provides guidance for all elements of the PACOM in developing future components of the system.

b. (U) The PCCSMP describes:

(1) (U) The mission, objectives and strategic concept of the PACOM.

(2) (U) The components of the PCCS.

(3) (U) The requirements for improvement of the system.

(4) (U) The objectives for the future development of the total system.

c. (U) The PCCSMP is based on the following principles:

(1) (U) Design for the PACOM as a whole.

(2) (U) Optimize for crisis situations ranging across the spectrum of conventional war through a preliminary exchange possibly leading to general nuclear war.

(3) (U) Exploit modern technology with minimum emphasis on long-term research and development efforts.

(4) (U) Reduce dependence on fixed locations.

(5) (U) Obtain commercially available systems/equipment when advantageous.

(6) (U) Promote interoperability among Service components, subunified commands and allies whenever possible.

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(7) (U) To monitor the performance and/or evaluate daily command and control operations, disaster relief, crisis response operations and exercises to detect procedural/functional C3S shortfalls which validate or define new C3S requirements.

2. (S) [

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a. (S) [

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b. (U) PACOM Strategic Objectives. The PACOM strategic objective is to provide for stability and peaceful change through:

- (1) (U) Ensuring free access to lines of communications.
- (2) (U) Providing deterrence to aggression.
- (3) (U) Maintaining confidence in commitments.
- (4) (U) Promoting and assisting regional and local self defense.
- (5) (U) Encouraging relaxation of tensions.

c. (S) PACOM Strategic Concept. The PACOM strategic concept envisions:

- (1) (U) Mobile sea, air and land forces located in forward areas.
- (2) (U) Protection of lines of communication.
- (3) (S) A PACOM command and control system which accommodates scenarios and environments throughout the PACOM area of responsibility, provides effective monitoring of day-to-day operations, and allows appropriate reaction to significant events in stressed conditions.

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(4). (U) The ability to respond to single or multiple, related or unrelated crises covering the full spectrum of military activity.

3. (U) PACOM CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. (U) Guidance and procedures for the conduct of crisis actions are contained in JOPS Vol IV (Crisis Action System). A crisis is an incident or situation that rapidly develops, external to CONUS, and creates a condition of such diplomatic, political, or military importance to the US Government that commitment of US military forces is contemplated to satisfy national objectives.

b. (S) [

]

(1) (U) Real-time information exchange with intelligence units at the lowest practicable levels.

(2) (U) Command-wide, secure voice conferencing.

(3) (U) Automated systems for maintaining US force status and third country/unfriendly order of battle information.

(4) (S) [

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c. (U) Crisis response operations other than those described in existing contingency plans are addressed in Enclosure (3).

d. (U) Nuclear operations are published separately as Enclosure (4).

u
4. (S) CINCPAC RESPONSIBILITIES. CINCPAC exercises operational command over assigned forces for the accomplishment of his mission. Explicit tasks inherent in the mission include the requirement and/or authority to:

a. (U) Communicate directly with the National Command Authorities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of the Services and subordinate elements, including the developmental organizations of the defense agencies and/or the military department directly supporting the development and acquisition of the PACOM Command and Control System.

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b. (U) Exercise those functions of command over assigned forces involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of assigned missions.

c. (U) Assume temporary operational control, in the event of a major emergency, over all forces except those scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution of JCS approved plans.

d. (U) Provide for military representation, where required, to all supranational, international, and US national agencies and furnish military representation, advice and assistance to Chiefs of the US Diplomatic Missions for negotiation of base rights, except as otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. (U) Be prepared to protect US citizens, their property and interests, US property, and designated foreign nationals within the PACOM.

f. (U) Keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly advised of significant incidents including accidents or other events affecting treaty or agreement enforcement.

g. (U) Maintain and protect early warning surveillance systems, as appropriate, and ensure dissemination of their information.

h. (U) Prepare plans for supplementary collection operations against foreign nuclear weapons tests and against foreign missile or space-associated activities.

i. (U) Develop and maintain the capability for execution of the SIOP and general war plans when so directed. Be prepared for survival, recovery and reconstitution in a postnuclear attack environment.

j. (U) Establish joint task forces, subordinate unified commands and separate uni-Service forces when authorized and required.

k. (U) Establish and maintain rules of engagement in conformity with rules promulgated by higher authority and provide the capability for direct modification by the NCA.

l. (U) Develop plans for the conduct of submarine, antisubmarine and mining operations to control and protect shipping throughout the PACOM area.

m. (U) Exercise directive authority over logistical matters.

n. (U) Establish and coordinate policies affecting the intelligence activities of the command.

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- o. (U) Conduct advisory and assistance operations within the PACOM.
- p. (U) Be prepared to support refugee evacuation, disaster relief and evacuation of US noncombatant and certain non-US persons as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- q. (U) Be prepared to provide coordinated military support to civil authorities during civil defense and other domestic emergency operations.
- r. (S) [
- s. (S) [

5. (U) CINCPAC COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). See Figures 1 and 2.

a. (U) CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and CDRWESTCOM, as the PACOM Service component commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the PACOM Service elements and should contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

b. (U) There are two subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:

(1) (U) United States Forces, Korea (USFK).

(2) (U) United States Forces, Japan (USFJ).

c. (U) CINCPAC is accredited as the US Military Adviser/Representative to the following organizations:

(1) (U) ANZUS Council: US Military Representative.

(2) (U) Philippines-US Council of Foreign Ministers: US Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Board.

(3) (U) US-Japan Security Consultative Committee: Member and principal adviser on military defense matters to the Chairman of the US representation.

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d. (U) Representatives of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC-REP): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where the significant activities of two or more Services are effected.

(1) (U) Commander, US Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC representative, Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI).

(2) (U) Commander, US Naval Forces Philippines, is the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines.

(3) (U) USAF Liaison Officer to the Royal Australian Air Force is the CINCPAC Representative, Australia.

(4) (U) Commander, Naval Station Adak, is CINCPAC Representative, Aleutian Islands.

(5) (U) Chief, JUSMAG Thailand, is CINCPAC Representative, Thailand.

(6) (U) COMIDEASTFOR is CINCPAC Representative, Indian Ocean.

(7) (U) CINCPAC Representative, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS)/Joint Strategic Connectivity Staff (JSCS), Strategic Air Command, represents PACOM in SIOP planning and strategic communications respectively.

(8) (U) CINCPAC Liaison Officer to the Commander, Alaskan Air Command provides liaison relative to activities jointly affecting the Pacific Command and the Alaskan Air Command.

e. (U) Chiefs of Security Assistance Programs: Security Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM by Military Assistance Advisory Groups or US Defense Attaches in Japan, Thailand, Korea, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Burma.

f. (U) United States Defense Representatives (USDR): USDRs provide for US governmental coordination to improve the interface between noncombat DOD elements in-country, the US Ambassador, and the host-country defense establishment. Representatives are assigned in the following areas: Japan, Korea, Peoples Republic of China, Hong Kong, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, Burma, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Malaysia, Singapore, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. CINCPAC designates the position in each country to be assigned USDR duties. USDR duties are normally, but not necessarily, assigned to the senior military officer in the country. (See figure 3).

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6. (U) THE THREAT TO PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL.

a. (S) [

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(1) (S) [

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(2) (S) [

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(a) (S) [

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b. (C) []

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c. (S) []

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(2) (S) []

(3) (S) []

SECTION 2

PACOM Command and Control System (U)

1. (S) []

a. (U) Monitor and evaluate the worldwide military/political situation.

b. (S) []

c. (S) []

d. (U) Provide the CINCPAC Command Center and its alternates with an information base that supports the command decision making process.

e. (U) Develop and control operational, UNITREP, and CAOSOP reporting procedures.

f. (U) Develop and maintain a Military Strike, Residual Capability and Damage Assessment program.

g. (U) Develop procedures for the control of nuclear weapons in the PACOM.

2. (U) CURRENT COMPOSITION.

a. (S) []

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b. ⁴~~(c)~~ The major components of the PACOM Command and Control System are the:

- (1) (U) CINCPAC Command Center, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii.
- (2) (U) CINCPAC Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) Hickam AFB,
Hawaii
- (3) (U) CINCPAC Airborne Command Post (ABNCP)
- (4) (U) Components Commands:
 - (a) (U) WESTCOM Command Center at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii
 - (b) (U) Pacific Fleet Command Center at Makalapa,
Hawaii
 - (c) (C) Pacific Air Force Command Center at Hickam AFB,
Hawaii
- (5) (U) Subordinate Commands:
 - (a) (U) US Forces Korea forward Command Post, in Seoul,
Korea.
 - (b) (U) US Forces Japan Command Center, collocated with
5AF at Yokota, Japan.
- (6) (U) Command Centers of deployed Joint Task Forces under
operational control of CINCPAC.
- (7) (U) Reconnaissance forces as specified by CINCPAC.
- (8) (U) PACOM intelligence units.
- (9) (U) Primary and alternate commands centers of all US
Headquarters down to the level required to execute necessary war plans
(including nuclear) and fulfill the CINCPAC mission.

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SECTION 3

Command and Control System Objectives (U)

1. (S) [

2. (S) [

a. (U) Technical Evolution. Exploiting technical advances as they become available and utilizing experience to guide future developments to meet changing requirements.

b. (U) Interrelationship of Command, Control Operations with Communications and Computer Systems. Military command, control, communications and computer (C³) systems are an inherent part of military operations.

c. (U) Security. Communications Security (COMSEC) is essential to all types of military communications. Vulnerability to interception and jamming is a threat that must be considered when planning for new or upgrading existing communications systems or networks.

d. (U) Speed. The time required to issue warning orders, process critical intelligence, execute operations plans and direct day to day operations is a key element in accomplishing the mission. For joint planning purposes, the objective is to consolidate telecommunications and command center support into a single facility to serve all subscribers in a geographical area wherever practical and economically feasible.

e. (U) Reliability of Command and Control Functions. Reliability or continuous functional connectivity is considered the most important

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supporting function of command. This can be achieved by management actions such as system engineering, equipment design, alternate routes, operator training and proper maintenance to name a few.

f. (U) Survivability. In addition to equipment design, survivability can be achieved by redundant paths, mobility, dispersal of key facilities, and dual homing techniques. All factors that will enhance survivability will be considered in planning C² facilities.

g. (U) Flexibility. To meet changing conditions and operational requirements, C² systems should incorporate equipment design, commercial facilities, mobile units or prepositioned facilities into the overall command control concept.

h. (U) Interoperability. Functionally similar C² system. It also tends to reduce cost, training and interface factors while increasing reliability and flexibility.

i. (U) Standardization of Equipment. Standardization of equipment reduces compatibility and commonality problems within a C² system. It also tends to reduce cost, training and interface factors while increasing reliability and flexibility.

j. (U) Economy. Valid operational requirements must be satisfied within budgetary constraints. Economy may be achieved by:

(1) (U) Consolidation of closely located, similar facilities under a single service where feasible.

(2) (U) Integration of special systems into the DCS switched system without service degradation.

(3) (U) Maximum use of DCS common user networks.

(4) (U) Use of commercial leased service when appropriate.

(5) (U) Efficient management of resources and effective communications discipline. (Note: The decision to apply automation to command and control functions will be based on the inability of existing manual procedures to satisfy mission requirements and the cost effectiveness of the proposed automated systems incorporating digital transmission, bulk encryption, and single message coding technologies as developed. Record and voice communications privacy must be provided for system user).

k. (U) Credible, inspiring belief or trust based on the user's perception of the information's accuracy, timeliness, availability, intelligibility and validity.

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1. (X) []

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m. (U) Secure, incorporating digital transmissions, bulk encryption, and single message coding technologies. Record and voice communications privacy must be provided for system users..

n. (X) []

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(1) (U) Other systems of the WWMCCS.

(2) (U) Command and Control systems of friendly national forces.

3. (X) []

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a. (X) []

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b. (X) []

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c. (S) [

d. (S) [

e. (S) [

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f. (U) Provide for real-time interchange of alarm and warning information.

g. (U) Provide the interface with US facilities that can furnish attack and damage assessment information.

h. (U) Provide the NMCS with essential information pertaining to military situations and PACOM capabilities to accomplish assigned missions.

i. (U) Allow CINCPAC to exercise designated directive authority in the field of logistics.

j. (U) Provide for the non military communications needs of the President, national leaders, and essential diplomatic and intelligence activities under emergency conditions.

k. (U) Facilitate realistic exercises without degradation of its primary functions or state of readiness.

l. (U) Provide the necessary hardware and software safeguards for the processing of all-source intelligence data.

m. (U) Receive, store, retrieve and display meteorological/oceanographic information for any point or portion of the command.

n. (U) Interoperate with in-theater tactical C3 systems supporting joint or combined operations.

4. (U) SYSTEM GOALS.

a. (S) [

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(1) (U) System Survivability: To insure PACOM C³ Systems are sufficiently survivable to allow effective command and control of assigned forces throughout levels of conflict, the following more immediate CINCPAC goals are established:

(a) (U) Identify specific vulnerabilities of PACOM C³ Systems through more realistic exercises and the C3S Evaluation Program.

(b) (U) 7

(c) (U) 7

7

1 (U) Establishment of a Hardness Control Agency (HCA) within the C3S Directorate (Feb 81).

2 (U) Transfer the APACHE data base from GTE Sylvania to CINCPAC (Jun 81).

3 (U) Obtain graphics terminal and plotter to allow effective update and utilization of APACHE data base.

4 (U) Execute contract for the EMP protection of one system end-to-end path on Oahu (Apr 81).

5 (U) In conjunction with the HCA, establish a hardness awareness program within the PACOM.

2 (U) Standardization and Interoperability. Functionally similar C² systems and standardization of equipment and procedures reduce compatibility and commonality problems. Standardization and interoperability will be enhanced through the following CINCPAC goals:

(a) (U) Complete CINCPAC effort to define the scope and the requirements to rectify PACOM US and Allied C³ standardization and interoperability shortfalls.

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(d) (U) Transfer requested classified material to GOJ which is necessary to achieve minimally acceptable Air Defense Systems interoperability. Develop concept of operations for US-GOJ combined operations.

(e) (U) Complete comprehensive analysis and validate the USFJ Defense Coordination Center Required Operational Capability (ROC).

(f) (U) Develop a data base of US and Allied C² systems to include impact of differing employment doctrines, equipment, protocols, procedures, operating parameters and frequency allocations.

(3) (U) System Requirements. To insure requirements generation and programming actions provide adequate future C³ capabilities to meet the anticipated threat, the following near-term goals are established:

(a) (U) Construct a worst case scenario which exemplifies C³ degradation throughout the levels of conflict.

(b) (U) Review all PACOM requirements for currency, validity and shortfalls with special emphasis on the joint and combined operations.

(c) (U) Expand the PACOM C² Master Plan to include component requirements and more specific objectives.

b. ~~(S)~~ L

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c. (U) Computer Support. The long-term PACOM system will evolve into a loosely coupled, decentralized, modular system of dedicated small processors and intelligent graphics terminals. Larger processing

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capabilities will be required at one or two PACOM nodes to respond to higher volume requirements. Major interactive processing such as data conversion, mathematics, editing, conversation between terminals, "graphics" conferencing, maintenance of small data bases, etc., will be distributed to intelligent terminals support by mini/micro processor clusters. These terminals would be located with and operated by the functional users. More immediate goals to enhance computer support in the PACOM are:

- (1) (U) Achieve 95% availability of computer resources.
 - (2) (U) Improve WIN reliability through addition of equipment (2 IMPS) and reconfiguration of satellite connectivity.
 - (3) (U) Expand capability of Command Center Watch Teams through training and procedural changes.
 - (4) (U) Improve throughput by installing a level 6 mini-computer at Camp Smith.
- d. (U) Executive Aids. The PCCS must integrate communications and automatic data processing. It should have the capability to process, synthesize, extract, disseminate and display data in summary form through an internetted system of computers/communications facilities and display devices.

SECTION 4

Requirements (U)

1. (U) GENERAL.

a. (U) The improvement effort for the PCCS is designed to ensure that all development and/or modernization efforts are compatible.

b. (U) PACOM needs an increased capability to acquire, correlate, integrate, utilize and transmit information. Existing programs within DOD address certain portions of the total PACOM requirement (e.g., Tri-Tac, WIN, AFSATCOM, etc.). Other aspects are covered by the PACOM ROCs described in Enclosure (2). The following paragraphs address identified requirements and current efforts to meet the long-term system goals enumerated in paragraph 3 of Section 3. Table 1 also lists CINCPAC C² requirements in a prioritized order. The criteria used to determine relative priority are included.

2. (U) COMMUNICATIONS.

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e. (S) [

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f. (S) [

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3. (U) FACILITIES.

a. (U) CINCPAC Command Center. Space and layout limitations of the early CINCPAC Command Center was an ad hoc arrangement and seriously impaired the ability of personnel to operate effectively in crisis situations. To remedy this situation, a Command Center Modernization project was funded and initiated in May 1977. The modernization of CINCPAC Command Center was completed in the Fall of 80.

b. (U) Airborne Command and Control.

(1) (S) [

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(2) (S) [

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c. (S) C

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d. (U) Emergency Power Support. Emergency power equipment supporting the PACOM C² network consists of a combination of generator sets, uninterruptable power systems, and floating battery power. Upon failure of a normal power source, this equipment provides electrical power required to continue the operations of the C² facilities. The emergency power support is currently being provided by generally old and hybrid equipment that is becoming progressively more difficult to maintain. To improve the reliability of the PACOM C² system, standard off-the-shelf equipment should be acquired.

4. (U) COMPUTER SUPPORT.

a. (U) General. WWMCCS ADP support HQ CINCPAC, subunified commands and service components. These systems are positioned as shown on figure 4. Figure 5 shows direct and AUTODIN communication interconnection for the various systems. Figure 6 shows changes expected during the budget and authorization years. Navy WWMCCS ADP assets on Oahu (C² GENSER) have been consolidated at the PACOM WWMCCS Regional ADP Center (PACWRAC), Makalapa, Pearl Harbor. The PACWRAC supports CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and CDRWESTCOM. The remaining CINCPAC H6060 services nuclear operations only.

b. (U) Interconnection. Host computers for both GENSER and intelligence must be appropriately interconnected to permit direct interchange of data necessary to support decision making. No solution to the multi-level security problem inherent in this interconnection is foreseen prior to WWMCCS Information System (WIS), the current WWMCCS ADP follow-on. All PACOM hosts are now participants in the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) as depicted in Figure 7. An absolute requirement for effective WIN utilization is the free sharing of the maximum amount of pertinent data between the various levels of command.

5. (U) EXECUTIVE AIDS.

a. (U) PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System (PACAIDS). PACAIDS is a system which allows audio and video information to be transmitted among crisis action nodes in the CINCPAC Command Center. Video information from selected sources can be displayed on either or both of two large group display screens in the Command Center. The PACAIDS system will meet CINCPAC's information distribution requirements for the foreseeable future. This Required Operational Capability became operational in the fall of 80.

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6. (U) SUBUNIFIED COMMANDS.

a. (U) US Forces in Korea (USFK). Commander USFK (COMUSK) is responsible for those US forces assigned to Korea. In the event of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, COMUSK, acting as CINC Combined Forces Command (CINCCFC), will direct the defense of Korea. The command and control system available to the Commander COMUSK/CINCCFC, is primarily supported by a single strand DCS backbone communications net. The vulnerability of the DCS in Korea and increased needs of the commander has surfaced new requirements. These requirements have been identified in this plan (through ROCs) and in other plans and studies listed below:

(1) (U) Telecommunication Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK). The purpose of TPICK is to provide a single integrated telecommunications planning document which addresses the command and control communications requirements. The goal of TPICK is to achieve total visibility of current, mid-range, and long-range CE planning efforts for Korea which support the combined US/ROK needs under normal, crisis, and wartime conditions. TPICK recommends actions to reduce the vulnerability of communications facilities and to improve the survivability, quality, and capability of the telecommunications systems supporting COMUSK/CINCCFC. TPICK will remain a current document through the process of annual review, revision, and validation.

(2) (S) []

(3) (S) []

(4) (U) CINCPAC study of the Combined Forces Command (CINCPAC ltr 56; Ser S81 of 5 March 1980). This study was conducted to assess and make recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness of CFC. Several issues were addressed and included recommendations for improvements to the overall command and control system in Korea.

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b. (S) [

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(2) (S/NOFORN) [

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SECTION 5

Interoperability (U)

1. (U) GENERAL. Interoperability between military forces is becoming increasingly important during an era of limited resources, rapid technological advancements, and the advent of rapid deployable joint task forces. Recent crisis in the Indian Ocean has further stressed the need for improved interoperability among military forces. Interoperability is not limited to any one individual area or service but cuts across all functional lines. It involves focusing on procedures, command and control tactics, logistics, intelligence and all those other functional areas that make up a coordinated military operation. However, within the context of this plan only interoperability of PACOM Command and Control and related communication and computer support systems is addressed.

2. (U) DEFINITION. Interoperability is defined in JCS Pub 1 as: (1) "The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. . (2) The condition achieved among communications - electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users." This definition really only touches on the scope of the problem. Figure 8 carries it further and makes a valid distinction between three other often misunderstood concepts when dealing with interoperability. That is the relationship between, compatibility, interoperability, and operational effectiveness. Compatibility can end at the terminals of a communications circuit. Interoperability can only be a reality if the two decision makers have the same understanding of the situation and react to the situation in a predictable manner and the third element, operational effectiveness, is very heavily dependent upon compatibility of communications and interoperability of forces. Finally, it is extremely important when dealing with interoperability issues that those issues do not get bogged down in the strictly communications - electronic aspect. It is imperative that the issues remain in the umbrella context of a PACOM Command and Control System approach.

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3. (U) CURRENT ACTIONS. Improving interoperability between the US Services and between US Forces and Allies has been a major goal in the PACOM for some time. Several separate actions are being addressed to improve interoperability. Actions underway include:

a. (U) Efforts to identify interoperability problems that exist among ANZUS nations.

b. (U) Study to identify and develop procedures to disseminate selected intelligence information to the Philippines Armed Forces.

c. (U) Initiatives to review requirements and procedures to enhance combined operations in the Indian Ocean.

d. (U) A joint assessment of C3I operational requirements for elements in WESTPAC was completed and forwarded to JCS in May of 1980. This study identified several basic issues pertinent to interoperability. (See Section 4, paragraph 6(a)(3) above.)

e. (U) Support of Rapid Deployable Joint Task Forces that may be deployed to the PACOM theater.

f. (U) Tracking of major issues and development efforts, (e.g. JINTACCS, JTIDS, TRI-TAC) to identify early on those areas that may impact the PACOM.

4. (U) FUTURE ACTIONS. Most interoperability problems seem to stem from the lack of a stated requirement and the fact that no single organization/agency has the primary responsibility to set or enforce standards. PACOM's greatest leverage on interoperability problems may thus be through the identification and statement of requirements. CINCPAC influence over R&D, acquisition, and procurement processes have traditionally been left to Service prerogatives. In addition, each of the Service commands has their own unique interoperability requirements since their respective operation environment differs. However, CINCPAC must view interoperability from a total PACOM Command and Control System approach. It is therefore essential that CINCPAC review all C² requirements, submitted by components to their respective parent services, in order to recognize, identify and propose solutions to potential PACOM interoperability issues before they become major problems or adversely affect mission execution.

SECTION 6

Evaluation (U)

1. (U) The evaluation procedures for PACOM joint exercises are listed in CINCPAC Instruction 3518.1. It states that "evaluation of exercises is used to identify areas or procedures in which additional emphasis is required to improve joint operational readiness in the PACOM...."

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
2. (U) A major CINCPAC sponsored exercise, conducted by CFC Korea is the Team Spirit series. C3S aspects of the exercise are evaluated under the JCS guidelines and the results are published each year in the Fall edition of the Semiannual Report on Performance Evaluations of C3S. Findings from these yearly exercise evaluations have helped increase the readiness and effectiveness of joint and combined command and control operations within South Korea and between CFC Korea and other supporting commands or agencies. The findings have also validated or established various C² system requirements.

3. (U) The C3S Directorate at CINCPAC Headquarters is developing a broader C3S performance evaluation program to increase the scope of C3S readiness evaluations. The C3S Directorate will soon publish a CINCPAC Instruction implementing a program for performance evaluation of the components of the PACOM C3S and thus the system as a whole in addition to exercise evaluations. The aim of this expanded evaluation program is to relate the effectiveness of PACOM C3S in fulfilling the PACOM C² system functions stated in Section 2, paragraph 1 a through g and in achieving those capabilities listed in Section 3, paragraph 2 a through n. Final conceptualization, definition and design of the program will be accomplished during FY 81 and portions are already in progress.

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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM



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FIGURE 1

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
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THE PACIFIC COMMAND



SOURCE: J56

FIGURE 2
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(USDR)

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FIGURE 3

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABNCP	AIRBORNE COMMAND POST
ABCC	AIRBORNE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
ABCCC	AIRBORNE BATTLEFIELD COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER
ACA	ALTERNATE COMMAND AUTHORITY
ACC	ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTER
ADP	AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
AFSAT	AIR FORCE SATELLITE
ALCOP	ALTERNATE COMMAND POST
ANMCC	ALTERNATE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
AOBC	ACTION OFFICER BRIEFING CONSOLE
ASC	AUTODIN SWITCHING CENTER
ASIC	ALL-SOURCE INFORMATION CENTER
ASW	ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
AUTOCONET	AUTODIN CONFERENCING NETWORK
AUTODIN	AUTOMATIC DIGITAL NETWORK
AUTOSEVOCOM	AUTOMATIC SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
AUTOVON	AUTOMATIC VOICE NETWORK
BSC	BATTLE STAFF COMMANDER
BSOC	BATTLE STAFF OPERATIONS CENTER
C2	COMMAND AND CONTROL
C3	COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS
C3I	COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE
C4	COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS
CAOSOP	COORDINATED ATOMIC OPERATIONS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
CC	COMMAND CENTER
CCBR	COMMAND CENTER BRIEFING ROOM
CDO	COMMAND DUTY OFFICER
CFC	COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
CHMDAO	CHIEF MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE
CHUSDLG	CHIEF U.S. DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP
COMMANDO ESCORT ..	PACAF HF/SSB RADIO NET
COOP	CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLAN
CRT	CATHODE RAY TUBE
CSE	COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT
CTAN	CINCPAC TELETYPE ALERT NET
CVAN	CINCPAC VOICE ALERT NET
DATT	DEFENSE ATTACHE
DCA	DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DCAC	DEPUTY CRISIS ACTION COORDINATOR
DCS	DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
DDI	DUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
DISIDS	DISPLAY AND INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
DSCS	DEFENSE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
DSP	DEFENSE SUPPORT PROGRAM
EAM	EMERGENCY ACTIONS MESSAGE
EMATS	EMERGENCY MESSAGE AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

EMCON	EMERGENCY CONDITION
ERCS	EMERGENCY ROCKET COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
EWO	EMERGENCY WAR ORDER
FCC	FLEET COMMAND CENTER
FLTSAT	FLEET SATELLITE
FOC	FINAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
FSK	FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING
GAPSAT	GAPFILLER SATELLITE
GENSER	GENERAL SERVICE
GEP	GROUND ENTRY POINT
HICOM	HIGH FREQUENCY COMMAND NET
HF	HIGH FREQUENCY
ICSB	INTERIM COMMAND SWITCHBOARDS
IDHS	INTELLIGENCE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM
IEMATS	IMPROVED EMERGENCY MESSAGE AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEM
IOC	INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
I/O	INPUT/OUTPUT DEVICES
IPAC	INTELLIGENCE CENTER PACIFIC
ISB	INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASE
I & W	INDICATIONS AND WARNING
JCIS	JOINT COMMAND INFORMATION SYSTEM
JCSAN	JCS ALERT NET
JCSE	JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT
JINTACCS	JOINT INTEROPERABILITY OF TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
JOPREP	JOINT OPERATIONAL REPORTING
JRC	JOINT RECONNAISSANCE CENTER
JTF	JOINT TASK FORCE
LDMX	LOCAL DIGITAL MESSAGE EXCHANGE
LGD	LARGE GROUP DISPLAYS
LICK	LIGHTWEIGHT COMMUNICATIONS KIT
LOC	LINE OF COMMUNICATION
LRC	LOGISTICS READINESS CENTER
MEECN	MINIMUM ESSENTIAL EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NET
MUX	MULTIPLEX
MWDS	MISSILE WARNING DETECTION SYSTEM
NCA	NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES
NEACP	NATIONAL EMERGENCY AIRBORNE COMMAND POST
NEDS	NAVAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISPLAY STATION
NMCC	NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
NMIC	NATIONAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER
NOC	NUCLEAR OPERATIONS CENTER
OAG	OPERATIONS ACTION GROUP
ODC	OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION
OPG	OPERATIONS PLANNING GROUP
OR	OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
PACAIDS	PACOM CRISIS ACTION INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
PACCAT	PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTODIN TERMINALS
PACCS	POST ATTACK COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
PACSIOP	ADDRESS IDENTIFICATION GROUP FOR PACIFIC SIOP UNITS

PACWRAC	PACIFIC WWMCCS REGIONAL ADP CENTER
PARPRO	PEACETIME AIR RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
PCCS	PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
PCCSMP	PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM MASTER PLAN
PDSC	PACOM DATA SYSTEMS CENTER
PWRS	PREPOSITIONED WAR RESERVE STOCK
RBP	REMOTE BATCH PRINTER
R2DC3	RAPID REACTION, DEPLOYABLE, COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
REMAH	REMOTE MARSHALLING BASES
RTF	REMOTE TASK FORCE
ROC	REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
SAR	SEARCH AND RESCUE
SCAP	SMALL COMMUNICATIONS AUGMENTATION PACKAGE
SCI	SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
SHF	SUPER HIGH FREQUENCY
SI	SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SIOP	SINGLE INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL PLAN
SURVSAT	SURVIVABLE SATELLITE
TACAMO	TAKE CHARGE AND MOVE OUT - VQ3 EC130 AIRCRAFT
TACS/TADS	TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM/TACTICAL AIR DIRECTION SYSTEM
TRI-TAC	JOINT TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM
UHF	ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY
UNITREP	UNIT STATUS AND IDENTITY REPORT
USAF LNO	USAF LIAISON OFFICE
USDLO	UNITED STATES DEFENSE LIAISON OFFICE
USDRP	UNITED STATES DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE PAKISTAN
VIP	VISUAL INFORMATION PROCESSOR
VLf/LF	VERY LOW FREQUENCY/LOW FREQUENCY
WIN	WWMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK
WWABNCP	WORLDWIDE AIRBORNE COMMAND POST
WWMCCS	WORLDWIDE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

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CINCPAC REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

1. Purpose. Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) derived from the objectives described in Section 3 are listed in this enclosure as Appendices.

2. Background. The ROCs cite deficiencies that existed at the time they were submitted. Documentation based on the original statements remains valid. For full disclosure on the stated requirements, send request to CINCPAC/C3S. The ROCs have been prioritized with other PACOM requirements and are included in Table 1.

3. Current Status.

a. The following CINCPAC ROCs have been completed or superceded since the last revision of the PCCSMP and have been removed from the plan:

(1) ROC 1-77 - PACOM Crisis Action Information Distribution System (PACAIDS). An audio/visual information distribution system for crisis management is now in place within the CINCPAC Command Center. Information required by CINCPAC can be compiled in diverse locations throughout the headquarters, transmitted to the Command Center, assembled in meaningful displays, and presented to the decision makers through PACAIDS.

(2) ROC 8-75 - Expansion of CINCPAC ABNCP Ground/Air UHF Communications System. The UHF LOS range of the ABNCP has been extended to approximately 300NM by installing a remote antenna on Mt. Kaala, highest point on the island of Oahu.

(3) ROC 11-75 - Command Center Modernization. The modernized CINCPAC Command Center has now brought the resources necessary, under a more structured and functionally organized facility, to assist CINCPAC in the discharge of his responsibilities to the NCA.

(4) ROC 13-77 - ABNCP Long Haul Secure Voice Capability. This CINCPAC ROC has been replaced by CJOR 1-80.

b. Several new requirements have surfaced and have either been submitted to JCS or are in the process of being submitted. They are:

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<u>ROC</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
15-80	Mid-Range Joint Multi-Trunking Switching System (JMTSS)	New requirement Ref: Appendix I-1
16-80	WWMCCS ADP Support for Combined Forces Command in Korea	New Requirement Ref: Appendix J-1
17-80	CINCPAC Support Aircraft Secure Voice Capability	New requirement Ref: Appendix K-1
CJOR 1-80	ABNCP Long Haul Secure Voice Capability	Replaced CINCPAC ROC 13-77, Ref: Appendix L-1.
* CJOR 2-80	ABNCP Improved Trailing Wire Antenna	New requirement. Ref: Appendix M-1
* CJOR 3-80	WWMCCS ADP Support	Will Replace CINCPAC ROC 7-75. Ref: Appendix N-1
* CJOR 4-80	ABNCP Improved Automatic Switchboard System	New requirement. Ref: Appendix O-1

* Will be formally submitted to JCS when all coordinating CINCs have approved the ROC.

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COMMUNICATIONS FOR REMOTE TASK FORCE/JOINT TASK FORCE OPERATIONS
(ROC 4-75) (U)

1. (C) Description [

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2. (C) Justification: [

]

3. (X) Status: [

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PACOM MEECN COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENT (ROC 5-75) (U)

1. (S) Description: []

2. (S) Justification: []

3. (S) Status: []

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CINCPAC ABNCP OPERATIONS GROUND FACILITY WWMCCS INTERFACE
(ROC 6-75) (U)

1. (S) Description: []

2. (S) Justification: []

3. (S) Status: []

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CINCPAC ABNCP WWMCCS INTERFACE (ROC 7-75) (U)

1. (S) Description: [

2. (S) Justification: [

3. (S) Status: [

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SECURE VOICE/RECORD CONFERENCING NETWORK (ROC 9-75) (U)

1. (✓) Description: []

2. (✓) Justification: []

3. (✓) Status: []

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AUTOMATED MESSAGE PROCESSING SYSTEM (ROC 10-76)

1. Description:

a. To improve and speed the handling of message traffic during crisis/contingency operations for the Command Center and associated staff support activities, CINCPAC requires an automated system to provide for electronic preparation, distribution, transmission, file, edit, and coordination of command control narrative traffic.

b. The message handling system will form a highly automated interface between command control and planning action offices and CINCPAC's LDMX. The LDMX will hand off AUTODIN traffic destined for those offices and will receive and process outgoing AUTODIN traffic electronically generated and released from action office terminals. The message handling system will provide the capacity for electronically storing action messages, routing informal messages among system terminals, checking for proper formatting of outgoing AUTODIN traffic, providing automated assistance in preparing messages, and control the release of formal outgoing messages.

c. From appropriate terminals, action officers would review the stream of crisis traffic coming into and departing the headquarters and create special action files, as required. Through the automated features of the message handling system, they would be able to answer incoming traffic, address messages, extract portions of the text for briefings or for inclusion in outgoing messages, annotate messages as to action taken, and directly update status of actions data bases.

2. Justification: Command center operations, particularly in crises operations, depend heavily on the efficient performance of a host of clerical details. Many of these are associated with distribution, review, coordination, and preparation of message traffic. During crisis actions, the command center becomes, in effect, a collection of action centers and response cells throughout the headquarters, each working a particular piece of the overall problem. The present, manual methods of distribution, review, coordination, and action assignment delay the flow of information to commanders, decrease staff responsiveness, and consume time that can be better spent in dealing with the information and decisions themselves. Delays in processing actions translate directly into delays in deploying/employing the forces. The answer to improving crisis operations lies not in increasing the size of staffs to handle traffic loads, but rather to make the operations of a selected few more efficient.

3. Status: ROC 10-76 is undergoing a complete revision. CINCPAC is working in concert with USCINCEUR to develop a Joint Operational Requirement that will address the deficiency for both commands. Expect joint requirement to be submitted to JCS for validation mid CY 1980.

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ABNCP COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY UPGRADE (ROC 12-76) (U)

1. (U) Description:

a. (S) []

b. (S) []

2. (U) Justification:

a. (S) []

(1) (U) On-the-scene situation assessment and interpretation of available data;

(2) (U) coordination of whatever emergency action is required;
and

(2) (U) reaction to unexpected developments.

b. (S) []

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EXTENSION OF CINCPAC'S CRISIS RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
(ROC 14-78) (U)

1. (C) Description: [

a. (C) [

b. (C) [

c. (U) A platform with the same characteristics as the Airborne Communications Center (ABCC) represents the third required capability. Its capabilities are identified in the WWMCCS Selected Architecture Studies.

2. (C) Justification: [

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3. (e) Status: ☒

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APPENDIX H TO ENCLOSURE (2)

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WWMCCS REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR MIDRANGE JOINT MULTICHANNEL
TRUNKING AND SWITCHING SYSTEM (POST 1984) (ROC 15-80) (U)

1. (S) Description: []

2. (U) Justification:

a. (S) []

b. (S) []

c. (S) []

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3. (U) Status: DCA has been designated as the design architect/system engineer. ROC 15-80 awaiting JCS validation.

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APPENDIX I TO ENGLOSURE (2) I-2

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WWMCCS REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY FOR CINC,
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (ROC 16-80) (U)

1. (U) The CFC WWMCCS processing capability would be situated in the northern portion of the ROK to support the CINC CFC at HQ CFC in Yongsan or at CP TANGO. It would operate in a stand-alone configuration without direct connectivity to the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS. It would provide C² automatic data processing support to the CINC even in the event the DCS communications to the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS mainframe in Taegu are lost. It would have the capability to interface with the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS, i.e., C² information from the CFC data base which is required for input to the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS would be reduced to ADP media, and after the validation of the data and security classification, the information would be transmitted to the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS. Or, reversing the process, data from the COMUSKOREA WWMCCS which is RELROK would flow through the same procedure for CFC data base updates and report dissemination. In the event of hostilities and on the order of the Secretary of Defense, direct computer to computer linkage would be established. Support personnel for the CFC processing system would be provided jointly by ROK and US forces.

2. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Justification: 

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3. (U) Status: JCS has forwarded ROC 16-80 to DCA for TA/CE action or preliminary estimate, as appropriate.

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APPENDIX J TO ENCLOSURE (2)

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CINCPAC COMMAND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT LONG HAUL
SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS (ROC 17-80) (U)

1. (U) Description:

a. (S) [

b. (S) [

2. (U) Justification: [

3. (U) Status: Waiting JCS validation.

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ABNCP LONG HAUL SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS
CINC JOINT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (CJOR 1-80) (U)

1. (U) Description:

a. (S) []

b. []
(P) []

2. (U) Justification:

a. (S) []

b. []
(P) []

3. (U) Status: CJOR 1-80 has been formally endorsed by CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and USCINCEUR and forwarded to JCS for validation.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REVIEW ON: 30 JUNE 2000

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APPENDIX L TO ENCLOSURE (2)

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IMPROVED TRAILING WIRE ANTENNA SYSTEM FOR WWABNCP EC-135 AND E4A AIRCRAFT,
CINC JOINT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (CJOR 2-80) (U)

1. (S) Description: [

IS

2. (S) Justification: []

3. (U) Status: This requirement is still in coordination with CINCSAC,
CINCLANT, and CINCEUR.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REVIEW ON: 30 JUNE 2000

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APPENDIX M TO ENCLOSURE (2)

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ABNCP AIRBORNE AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP)
CINC JOINT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (CJOR 3-80) (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ Descriptive []

2. ~~(S)~~ Justification: []

3. (U) Status: CJOR 3-80 is now being finalized for endorsing CINCs review. When formally submitted to JCS, CJOR 3-80 will replace CINCPAC ROC 7-75.

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REVIEW ON: 30 JUNE 2000

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APPENDIX N TO ENCLOSURE (2)

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SWITCHBOARD FOR EC-135P ABNCP
CINC JOINT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (CJOR 4-80) (U)

1. (S) Description: [

2. (S) Justification: [

3. (U) Status: CJOR 4-80 is in the process of review and approval by the endorsing CINCs.

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REVIEW ON: 30 JUNE 2000

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CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS (U)

Ref: (a) CINCPACINST S3100.1B
(b) CINCPACINST 3120.25B
(c) CINCPACINST 3120.26
(d) CINCPAC OPORD 5117
(e) USREDCOM Manual 105-1
(f) WWMCCS Selected Architecture

1. (U) Situation:

a. (U) The vast area of the PACOM contains more than 100 million square miles and about two thirds of the world's population. It incorporates diverse religious, economic, cultural and political systems. Many of the countries in PACOM are in various stages of development, ranging from primitive agrarian to advanced industrial, and are undergoing rapid change. Their recent history features insurgency, coups, border conflicts and military incidents. In this environment, a climate of stress and tension which has the potential for further turmoil and conflict exists almost continuously.

b. (U) The perception among Asian nations that US interest and staying power in the Pacific are declining adds volatility to the situation. The withdrawal of US forces, new relationships between nations on the Asian mainland, and aggressive acts by nations attempting to assert their sovereignty, all contribute to an environment in which the possibility of confrontation is increased. Any indication of weakening US resolve heightens the possibility of adventurous acts to probe and test the limits of our commitment.

2. (U) Objective: CINCPAC conducts operations throughout the PACOM in response to crises and/or the directives of higher authority.

3. (U) Characteristics of the area:

a. (U) CINCPAC's area of responsibility comprises broad ocean expanses, critical LOCs and land areas of strategic importance to both the US and its allies. Within this area, time and distance factors complicate the military equation to an extent greater than in any other unified command. To illustrate the problem of timely response, an aircraft carrier requires a transit time of 11 days to move from the west coast to the Philippines. Six more days are required to move into an operating location in the Indian Ocean. A C-141 transport aircraft requires 18 hours to fly (via Honolulu) from a west coast base to the Philippines and an additional 8 hours to fly to Diego Garcia.

b. (U) Force deployments may be inhibited by a number of constraints depending upon the specific area of operations. Overflight restrictions, movement within territorial waters, OPSEC considerations and diplomatic

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clearances are examples of factors which may extend reaction time by either increasing the distance to be traveled or expanding the number of steps necessary to obtain a clearance to act.

c. (S) []

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4. (U) Forces:

a. (U) Command Arrangements.

(1) (U) If a crisis should occur in the operational area of an existing US command, the on-scene commander will assume responsibility for the initial response to the crisis IAW the provisions of CINCPACINST S3100.1B.

(2) (U) In the event that a Joint Task Force (JTF) is established for crisis operations, CINCPACINSTs 3120.25B and 3120.26 apply.

b. (U) Existing Command and Control Capabilities for Contingency use in Joint Operations.

(1) (U) In Theater.

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(b) (S) []

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(2) (U) Out-of-Theater.

(a) (U) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). If directed by JCS, the JCSE assigned to HQ USREDCOM may be tailored to provide specific communications support to CINCPAC for contingency operations. JCSE assets can be configured to provide a main and two forward operating bases. A short-range voice capability can be provided with man packed mobile HF, VHF, and UHF radios. To support long-range voice connectivity over distances up to 2,500 miles, the JCSE uses HF. UHF and VHF radios are used at a main operating base for local tactical applications. Other capabilities which might be found at the main operating base are a tactical satellite terminal, a communications center, a telephone exchange and a secure facsimile. Detailed communications capabilities for the JCSE are contained in USREDCOM Manual 105-1.

(b) (U) Joint Airborne Communications Center/Command Post (JACC/CP). The JACC/CP is an air-transportable communications package which can provide limited support while airborne and enhanced capabilities when on the ground. The JACC/CP package provides HF/SSB, UHF/AM, VHF/AM, and VHF/FM communications in both modes. During airborne operations, JACC/CP is capable of communicating with ground forces, escort planes, and strike aircraft. After arriving at the objective area or REMAB, an HF circuit can be established for communications through existing DCS terminals for worldwide AUTOVON access and secure full duplex teletype traffic.

(c) (U) Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC). The ABCCC EC-130 aircraft, modified and manned for use as an airborne battlefield command and control center, are located at Keesler AFB, MS. The ABCCC, capable of controlling strike, escort, support and refueling aircraft, has HF, VHF/AM, VHF/FM, UHF, short range secure voice, TTY and secure TTY. The radio suite offers the potential for C² use in crisis operations with appropriate personnel augmentation.

c. (U) Force Composition. Each crisis will require specially tailored forces constituted to address the imperatives of the contingency. The force assembled to deal with contingency or crisis operations may well require specialized skills (e.g., Seals, Rangers, etc.). It may be uni-Service or joint Service and it may include allies.

5. (U) Crisis response.

a. (U) General.

(1) (U) Experience has shown that a crisis intensifies and declines over time. The initial three steps in crisis management (situation development, crisis assessment, and course of action development)

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take place early in the life of the crisis. The remaining three steps (decision, execution planning, and execution) take place in the period immediately before the crisis peaks. Early recognition of a potential crisis situation is not a simple task since few begin with a catastrophic event.

(2) (S) It is anticipated that crises of the following types are most likely to occur in PACOM: Recovery of US assets, disaster relief, counter terrorism.

b. (U) Concept of resource commitment.

(1) (U) CINCPAC will commit land, air, and sea-based forces as necessary considering the urgency of the situation and availability of assets. The CINCPAC concept is to first employ in-theater, CINCPAC-controlled resources that can be moved quickly to the scene of the crisis in order to contain the situation at its lowest stage of development. These initial capabilities will be augmented by other in-theater capabilities as the situation warrants.

6. (U) C² Crisis Response Deficiencies.

(a) (U) General.

(1) (U) Typical crisis scenarios were developed to identify military actions in that portion of the crisis spectrum of most interest to PACOM. These scenarios were designed to exercise different force levels, command and control requirements, response times, and transportation modes in remote locations throughout PACOM.

(b) (U) Deficiencies.

(1) (U) There are presently some significant deficiencies in the required command and control system.

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c. (U) Airborne Crisis Response System.

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NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (U)

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BASELINE PACOM COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES (U)

1. (U) Introduction. PACOM command and control is exercised through existing facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel essential to planning, directing, executing and controlling the operation of forces pursuant to CINCPAC's mission. This annex documents the existing command, control, communications and computer (C4) facilities available in the PACOM and their major interface with the National Military Command System.

2. (S) [

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a. (U) Headquarters, Pacific Command (PACOM).

(1) (U) The CINCPAC Command Center, Camp Smith, Oahu, is an unhardened, all-source information facility which serves as the primary command center. It evolved in response to the day-to-day requirements of the war effort in Southeast Asia. It serves as the focus of activities necessary for the operational command of PACOM forces.

(2) (U) The CINCPAC Alternate Command Post (ALCOP) is an unhardened facility located within the CINCPAC ABNCP Operations Facility at Hickam AFB. It is an austere facility for short period use should the main CINCPAC Command Center be temporarily disabled due to natural disaster, bomb threat, fire or massive communication/power failure. The ALCOP's primary responsibility is SIOP execution.

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c. (U) Pacific Fleet (PACFLT).

(1) (U) The CINCPACFLT Fleet Command Center (FCC) at Makalapa, HI, is an all-source information facility which supports CINCPACFLT in the control of JCS-assigned Naval and Marine forces, including those under CINCPAC OPCOM. Major forces include Fleet Marine Force Pacific, Submarine Force Pacific, and 3rd and 7th Fleets.

(2) (U) Command and Control of the Submarine Force Pacific is exercised by the SUBPAC Command Center, Pearl Harbor, HI.

d. (U) Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). The HQ PACAF Command Center at Hickam AFB, HI, is an all-source information center which supports CINCPACAF command and control of Air Force units in PACOM. Major forces include 5th and 13th Air Forces.

e. (U) The subordinate unified commands possess command centers which provide CINCPAC with communications facilities to direct forces assigned to those commands. In addition, these centers support the subunified commanders in exercising their peacetime responsibilities. The centers are:

(1) (U) The US Forces Korea (USFK) forward command post, in Seoul, Korea, is a combined facility serving both COMUSKOREA and the 8th US Army. COMUSKOREA and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) interface at the forward command post. Other COMUSKOREA facilities include the main command post at TANGO, 17 km south of Seoul, and the rear command post at Taegu. (See Figure 1).

(2) (U) The US Forces, Japan (USFJ) command center, collocated with the 5AF facility at Yokota, Japan. (See Figure 13)

3. (U) [

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a. (U) Long-Haul Communications.

(1) (U) Submarine Cables. HF radio provided most long-haul circuitry in the Pacific west of Hawaii until the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 when a concentrated effort was made to realign circuits to the transpacific commercial submarine cable. Reliance on submarine cables

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has increased significantly. Figure 2 shows the interconnectivity of existing commercial and military submarine cables.

(2) ~~(U)~~ 

(3) (U) HF Radio. High frequency radio provides vital communications links with the fleet and airborne command posts in the Pacific. Long-haul HF radio connectivity is shown in Figure 5.

b. (U) Major Switching Systems.

(1) (U) AUTOVON. The Automatic Voice Network, consisting of automatic switching centers connected by long-haul trunks is the worldwide switched voice network of the DCS. It provides various conferencing, off-hook, abbreviated dialing, and precedence-oriented services. Authorized subscribers have direct access lines to the AUTOVON system but most users are connected through administrative exchanges on military installations. Five AUTOVON switching centers are located in PACOM. These switches, their interconnectivity and their interface with the CONUS are illustrated in Figure 6. Interswitch trunks are provided by cable, satellite, microwave and tropospheric scatter links. While CONUS and Hawaii AUTOVON switching centers are leased, those in the Western Pacific are operated and maintained by the military services.

(2) (U) AUTODIN. The Automatic Digital Network is the DCS worldwide, common-user, message and data system. Encrypted interswitch circuits operate at speeds from 75 to 4800 bits per second. Figure 7 shows the five automatic switching centers located in the PACOM and their interconnectivity with CONUS switches. The Wahiawa, Hawaii, switch is leased while the other four in the Western Pacific are government-owned and maintained.

(3) (U) AUTOSEVOCOM. The Automatic Secure Voice Communications Network provides wideband and narrowband secure voice service for traffic up to and including TOP SECRET/Special Intelligence (SI) for a limited number of subscribers of the worldwide Defense Communications System (DCS). AUTOVON is used by AUTOSEVOCOM for narrowband switching, long-haul transmission, and for subscribers that cannot be economically served by manual wideband switches. Certain subscribers receive the full system capability of precedence, preemption, automatic service and conferencing. Other subscribers are served by manual switchboards

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(SECORD). Within the Pacific theater, wideband service is presently provided from Pearl Harbor to Korea, the Philippines, Japan and the CONUS switch at NMCC. See Figure 8.

c. (U) Land Mass "Backbone" Communications.

(1) (U) OAHU. Communications on Oahu are generally leased from the Hawaiian Telephone Company but military microwave serves as a backup. Long-distance communications are provided by HF radio, undersea cables, and both military and commercial satellites. The only military submarine cable terminating on Oahu is the one from Johnston Island. See Figures 9, 10 and 11.

(2) (U) GUAM. The communications backbone on Guam consists of landlines, microwave, and a tropospheric scatter system to the Island of Saipan. Out-of-country communications are provided by the DSCS and INTELSAT with undersea cables to Hawaii (2), the Philippines, Australia, Hong Kong, Okinawa, and Japan. See Figure 12.

(3) (U) JAPAN. The backbone communications system on Japan is operated and maintained by the Nippon Electric Company for the US military. The system consists of a north/south tropospheric scatter system which was designed and installed to satisfy U.S. military requirements. Tail segments are generally cable and microwave, operated and maintained by the military. Leased broadband parallels the tropospheric scatter system on Honshu to provide command and control backup. Out-of-country communications from mainland Japan consist of a digital microwave radio system to Korea, undersea cable (TRANSPAC) to Guam and DSCS and INTELSAT satellite terminals. See Figure 13.

(4) (U) OKINAWA Prefecture. Okinawa is connected to mainland Japan via tropospheric radio. The on-island backbone system is provided by a U.S. military microwave system with landline tail segments. Out-of-country communications are provided by DSCS satellite and commercial underseas cable to Taiwan and Guam. See Figure 14.

(5) (U) KOREA. The US military communications backbone system in Korea consists of microwave, VHF radio, and cable links between U.S. installations. Out-of-country communications are provided by DSCS earth terminal at Taegu, an INTELSAT earth terminal at Kum San, and a digital microwave radio system from Changsan to Seburiyama, Japan. ROK Air Force and Army systems are shared with the U.S. to some extent. See Figure 15. Improvements to the Korean system are addressed in the Telecommunications Plan for Improvement of Communications in Korea (TPICK).

(6) (U) PHILIPPINES. The backbone communications on the Island of Luzon, Philippines, are tropospheric scatter and microwave with landlines and VHF radio tail segments. Major nodal points are Clark AB, Dau, Santa Rita, San Miguel, Cabuyo, Camp O'Donnell, Baler

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Bay, and the US Embassy in Manila. Out-of-country communications consist of commercial tropospheric scatter to Taiwan, undersea cable to Guam, and INTELSAT and DSCS interfaces. See Figure 16.

d. (U) Other Key Communications.

(1) (U) AUSTRALIA. There is no US military backbone system in Australia. US communications within country rely on the Australian systems. Out-of-country communications are provided by HF, DCSC, and commercial satellite/undersea cable with connectivity to Diego Garcia, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, and CONUS. See Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5.

(2) (U) INDIAN OCEAN. NAVCOMMSTA Diego Garcia supports national and naval communications operating requirements in the Indian Ocean. Satellite connectivity is maintained with Clark AB, RP while HF connectivity is maintained with NAVCOMMSTA H. E. Holt, Australia. (See Figures 3 and 5).

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a. (U) Emergency Networks.

(1) (U) Joint Chiefs of Staff Alerting Network (JCSAN) is a network of non-secure voice circuits using leased landlines, satellite, and submarine cables to link the NMCS with each of the unified and specified commands and the Canadian Defense Headquarters in Ottawa. JCSAN conferences/calls are initiated via push buttons on the Emergency Action consoles at the ANMCC and JCSAN is connected to the NMCC/ANMCC via two dedicated lines which are shared on a preemptive basis with associated tactical telephone switchboards. Control of the JCSAN can be seized by the ANMCC, if required, or in the event that connectivity to the NMCC is disrupted. JCSAN terminates at the Emergency Actions console in the CINCPAC Command Center and the ALCOP.

(2) (U) JCS Automatic Conference Arranger (JCS-ACA) is a nonsecure voice conferencing service utilizing the global AUTOVON conference arrangers located at two CONUS switch sites. Conferees include the three NMCS command centers, unified and specified command centers, Service operations centers and other selected subscribers. It provides the NMCS command centers and other authorized originators the ability to establish conferences in accordance with one of five selected patterns. JCS-ACA terminates at the Emergency Action Console in the CINCPAC Command Center and at the ALCOP.

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b. (U) Special Systems/Networks.

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(a) (U) HICOM Net. (CNO) provides single channel point-to-point voice communications between selected subscribers. The principal non-Navy users are CINCPAC, CINCLANT, and their airborne command posts. CINCPACFLT is the Pacific area HICOM control authority. COMTHIRDLFEET and COMSEVENTHFLEET are net control stations for EASTPAC and WESTPAC respectively. A subscriber is required to obtain permission from the net control station prior to contacting any other station in the network.

(b) (U) GIANT TALK (SAC) provides voice communications from CINCSAC to all SAC aircraft and missile launch facilities. CINCSAC is the primary network control station. The CINCPAC ABNCP enters GIANT TALK nets frequently.

(c) ~~(S)~~ []

c. (U) Integrated Networks/Systems.

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5. (U) Command/Control Systems/Networks in the Pacific.

a. (U) CINCPAC.

(1) (U) CINCPAC Voice Alert Network (CVAN) provides CINCPAC with a capability to convene conferences with component, subunified, and selected field commanders. It is the primary voice alerting system for the transmission of emergency action instructions to the PACOM Forces. System connectivity is shown in Figure 17. At CINCPAC, CVAN terminates in two identical consoles in the emergency action center and one console at the ALCOP. Direct connectivity between the JCSAN and CVAN consoles allows CVAN to extend JCSAN.

(2) (U) CINCPAC Teletype Alert Network (CTAN) provides CINCPAC with secure record communications to the immediate subordinate commanders shown in Figure 18. The circuits are dedicated and encrypted. During crisis situations, up to 4 CTAN circuits may be conferenced and operated directly from the CINCPAC Command Center.

(3) (U) All-Source Information Communications (ASICOMM) Network. The ASICOMM network provides a means of coordinating peacetime emergency actions using Special Intelligence (SI) channels to pass classified information. The CINCPAC is the net control with COMUSJAPAN/5AF serving as alternate network control facility. Members of the network are:

- CINCPAC
- COMUSJAPAN/5 AF
- CINCPACFLT
- COMUSKOREA
- CINCPACAF
- CINCAL
- 13AF
- CDRWESTCOM

Connectivity is shown in Figure 19. Network hubbing at CINCPAC and COMUSJAPAN/5AF permit all users to receive all transmissions initiated by any member of the net. Privacy of communications can be obtained

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with the prior coordination of the net and alternate Technical Controls. The teletype net operates in simplex mode (send or receive, but not simultaneously) and is secured by KW-7 crypto devices, requiring synchronization prior to each transmission.

(4) (U) PACOM Command and Control AUTODIN Terminals (PACCAT). Certain commands require dual accessed AUTODIN terminals to provide increased reliability for command and control. EAMs are disseminated over both PACCAT and CTAN to subordinate CINCPAC commanders.

(5) (U) PACOM AUTODIN Conferencing Network (AUTOCONET) provides CINCPAC with a means of passing record, all-source, time-sensitive information vertically and laterally and assists in effectively gathering, correlating, and displaying information on a near real-time basis. All network stations may be conferenced at the same time or messages may be sent between individual stations at up to Flash precedence. The system operates in a duplex mode with stations able to send and receive messages simultaneously. CINCPAC acts as net control. Members of the network and its configuration are shown in Figure 20.

(6) ~~(S)~~ [

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b. (U) Component Service Systems/Networks.

(1) (U) Navy.

(a) (U) Pacific Fleet Flash Net (FFN) is a network of secure TTY circuits connecting CINCPACFLT to selected PACFLT commanders, ashore and at sea. It acts as an extension of the CTAN from CINCPACFLT to his forces. The FFN is hubbed at NAVCAMSWESTPAC where an operator joins the landline, cable and radio circuits which comprise the net. The circuits are cryptographically protected with KW-7 devices and are cleared for traffic up to and including TOP SECRET.

(b) (U) PACFLT High Command Radio-telephone Network (HICOM). The PACFLT HICOM Net is an HF unsecure command and control voice circuit netting CINCPACFLT with commanders and individual ships at sea. When underway, all ships must maintain a listening watch on HICOM and be prepared to transmit on short notice. Specifically designated units must maintain continuous guard on the net. Navy Interim Command

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Switchboards (ICSB) at PACFLT NAVCOMMSTAs guard HICOM for the purpose of relay and interface with either a CVAN or AUTOVON conference or direct call. HICOM is divided into two area nets. NAVCAMSEASTPAC is the technical control station for the EASTPAC Net and NAVCAMSWESTPAC for the WESTPAC Net. COMTHIRDFLT and COMSEVENTHFLT are Net Control Stations for EASTPAC and WESTPAC respectively. A submarine near or on the surface can receive HICOM at the option of the operator. A ballistic submarine will not answer but an attack submarine may.

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(2) (U) Air Force COMMANDO ESCORT. The PACAF Command and Control HF/SSB Radio Network is a dedicated, tactical voice, point-to-point system which provides limited air/ground communications for authorized users. This restricted entry, long-haul system is composed of stations at key locations in order to provide rapid command and control communications for CINCPACAF, CINCPAC and other selected users. The overall COMMANDO ESCORT Net is divided into a system of sub-networks. The master net control station (MNCS) at Punamano normally maintains direct communications with other NCSs or their alternates. However, for communications with a tributary station, the MNCS may use either direct contact or relay contact through the tributary stations' parent NCS. Each COMMANDO ESCORT station is responsible for maintaining contact with its NCS, either by direct means or by back-to-back relay through any other COMMANDO ESCORT station.

(3) (U) Army WESTCOM C² Network. The WESTCOM C² network of secure voice and secure teletype subsystems are presently being designed.

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6. (U) WWMCCS ADP facilities in the Pacific:

	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>
a.	(U) CINCPAC	
	(1) (U) PACWRAC Facility, Pearl Harbor, HI	H6060 (PACOM 1)
	(2) (U) Command Center, Camp H. M. Smith, HI	H6060 (PACOM 2)
	(3) (U) CINCPAC ABNCP Ground Facility. Hickam AFB, HI	Terminal to Camp Smith
b.	(U) PACOM Subunified Commands	
	(1) (U) COMUSKOREA	
	(a) (U) Camp Walker Taegu, Korea	H6060 H716
	(b) (U) HQ USFK, Yongsan/TANGO	H716 van mounted
	(2) (U) COMUSJAPAN, Yokota AB, Japan	H735 (Hosting off COMUSK)
c.	(U) US Army WESTCOM Ft. Shafter, HI	Utilizes 3 remote terminal devices from the PACWRAC facility computer
d.	(U) US Navy HQ PACFL, PACWRAC Facility, Pearl Harbor, HI	H6060 (Dual), H725G(IMP)
e.	(U) US Air Force HQ PACAF Hickam AFB, HI	H6060; Level 6 (leased); H725G(IMP) IBM 360/50

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FIGURE 1

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PACIFIC MILITARY SATELLITE CONNECTIVITY




FIGURE 3




FIGURE 4

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



FIGURE 5

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PACIFIC AUTOVON SWITCHES & INTERCONNECTIVITY

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ENCLOSURE (5)FIGURE 6
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PACIFIC AUTODIN SWITCHES & INTERCONNECTIVITY




FIGURE 7

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


FIGURE 8




FIGURE 9

21




FIGURE 10

OAHU COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS




FIGURE 11




FIGURE 12




FIGURE 13




FIGURE 14

KOREAN WIDEBAND NETWORK




Figure 15

PHILIPPINES INTERCONNECT




FIGURE 16




FIGURE 17




FIGURE 18

CINCPAC ALL SOURCE INFORMATION CENTER LOOP - ASIC





FIGURE 19



PACOM AUTOCONET

~~SECRET~~

CINCPAC AIRBORNE COMMAND POST (U)

- (U) Ref: (a) JCSM 440-73, Policy and Procedures for Management of WWMCCS
(b) MEECN Master Plan
(c) CINCPAC OPLAN 5001
(d) CINCPAC OPLAN 5104
(e) CINCPAC OPORD 5117
(f) CINCPAC OPORD 5131
(g) CINCPAC Instruction S2060.1

1. ~~(S)~~ PURPOSE. []

2. (U) CINCPAC ABNCP MISSION.]

a. ~~(S)~~ []

b. ~~(S)~~ []]

3. (U) EXECUTION.]

a. (U) Concept of Operations.

(1) ~~(S)~~ []

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES
REVIEW ON: 30 JUNE 2000

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE (6)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

(2) (S) []

(3) (S) []

(4) (S) []

(a) (S) []

(b) (S) []

b. (S) []

(1) (S) []

(2) (S) []

(3) (S) []

(4) (S) []

(5) (S) []

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(7) (S) []

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ENCLOSURE (6)

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(8) (S) [

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(10) (S) [

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(11) (S) [

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(12) (S) [

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(13) (S) [

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4. (U) Existing Communications Systems.

a. (S) [

b. (S) []

c. (S) [

]

]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[

d. (S) [

]

5. (U) Factors Limiting ABNCP Operations.

a. (S) [

(1) (S) [

(2) (S) [

(3) (S) [

(4) (S) [

(5) (S) [

(6) (S) [

(7) (S) [

b. (S) [

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (6)

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[

(1) (S) [

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(3) (S) [

6. (U) CINCPAC ABNCP REQUIREMENTS.

a. (S) [

b. (S) [

c. (S) [

d. (S) [

e. (S) [

f. (X) [

(a) (X) [

(b) (X) [

(c) (X) [

g. (X) [

h. (X) [

i. (X) [

(a) (X) [

(b) (X) [

(c) (X) [

(d) (X) [

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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